1	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
3	HOUSTON DIVISION
4	
5	IN RE: \$ CASE NO. 20-33948-H1-11 \$ (JOINTLY ADMINISTERED)
6	FIELDWOOD ENERGY LLC and \$ HOUSTON, TEXAS
7	RESOURCES NS, LLC, \$ AUGUST 5, 2020 Debtors. \$ 8:00 A.M. TO 9:13 A.M.
8	Bestors. S 0.00 M.M. 10 J.13 M.M.
9	TELEPHONIC FIRST DAY HEARINGS (CONT'D)
LO	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARVIN ISGUR UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
L1	
L2	
L3	
L 4	APPEARANCES: SEE NEXT PAGE
L5	COURTROOM DEPUTY/ERO: RECORDED THROUGH COURTSPEAK NO LOG NOTES
L 6	(Audio distortion and glitches noted.)
L7	(
L8	
L 9	
20	TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE BY
21	JUDICIAL TRANSCRIBERS OF TEXAS, LLC 935 Eldridge Road, #144
22	Sugar Land, TX 77478 281-277-5325
23	www.judicialtranscribers.com
24	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording;
25	transcript produced by transcription service.

1 TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES 2 3 For the Debtors: WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP Clifford W. Carlson, Esq. 4 Alfredo R. Perez, Esq. 700 Louisiana, Ste. 1700 5 Houston, TX 77002 713-546-5040 6 Jason George, Esq. 7 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 8 212-310-8021 9 For The Hanover Insurance LANGLEY, LLP For The Hanover Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual 10 Brandon K. Bains, Esq. Insurance Company 1301 Solana Blvd. Bldg. 1, Suite 1545 11 Westlake, TX 76262 214-722-7171 12 13 For US Specialty LOCKE LORD, LLP Insurance Company Philip Eisenberg, Esq. 14 600 Travis, Suite 2800 15 Houston, TX 77002 713-226-1304 16 17 For RLI Insurance Company KREBS FARLEY & DRY Elliot Scharfenberg, Esq. 18 400 Poydras St., Ste. 2500 New Orleans, LA 70130 504-299-3583 19 20 For Apache Corporation HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH, LLP 21 Robin Russell, Esq. 600 Travis St., Ste. 4200 22 Houston, TX 77002 713-220-3625 23 24

TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES (CONT'D): DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, LLP For the Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders Natasha Tsiouris, Esq. 450 Lexington Ave. New York, NY 212-450-4361 For Fieldwood Energy LLC MICHAEL DANE, Sr. VP & CFO Fieldwood Energy, LLC 2000 W. Sam Houston Pkwy., S. Suite 1200 Houston, Texas 77042 (Please see also electronic appearances.)

HOUSTON, TEXAS; WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 2020; 8:00 A.M.

THE COURT: All right, good morning. We're here on the Fieldwood Energy case for a continuation of first day hearings. It's case 20-33948. We've made electronic appearances.

Mr. Carlson, I have enabled your phone. It's my understanding that you're taking the lead this morning, from the way we left things yesterday. If there's been a change in that, just let me know. But your line is the one that's authorized right now.

MR. CARLSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Cliff
Carlson of Weil Gotshal & Manges on behalf of the Debtors.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, I think we would like to just move forward with the agenda at kind of where we left off when we said -- I think where we left off, we were about to get on file a revised form of interim DIP order --

THE COURT: I've been looking.

MR. CARLSON: -- that we --

THE COURT: I've been looking.

MR. CARLSON: It should be -- it should be on file within the next couple minutes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CARLSON: And we can circle back on that motion after --

THE COURT: Yeah, you might want to get a little closer to your phone, Mr. Carlson.

MR. CARLSON: Can you hear me okay now?

THE COURT: That's better. Thank you.

MR. CARLSON: So, Your Honor, the next item on the agenda is the insurance motion, and that is at Item No. 2 on the agenda filed at Docket No. 4. And in this motion we're seeking really three types of relief.

Debtors want to continue their insurance programs and pay all prepetition amounts in the form of insurance premiums and claims, the workers compensation claims. The second form of relief is to continue their surety bond program and pay any prepetition amounts that are owed. And then third is to modify the automatic stay to allow employees to proceed with workers compensation claims against the company.

And as far as insurance programs, we have approximately \$8.4 million in obligations coming due in the interim period, and about -- approximately 1.5 million of that amount is prepetition (glitches in the audio) workers compensation plan, and then the balance post-petition amounts for (glitches in the audio).

We don't believe we owe any amounts for -- under the surety bond program, but we do wish to continue to pay amounts owed in connection with that program in the ordinary

course of business. It's a critical part of the operation that approximately \$1.2 billion in surety bonds remains outstanding and about 15 million of premiums last year, and I would ask for authority to continue that program as well.

We have never received an objection from a surety bond holder, Liberty Mutual and Hanover. I understand Mr. Perez has been in discussions with the counsel and would turn it over to him to discuss those discussions.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Perez, go ahead.

MR. PEREZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Alfredo
Perez on behalf of the Debtors. Your Honor, we have been
in discussions with Mr. Bains, who represents Liberty and
Hanover. He suggested some language. We actually -- I
spoke with him before this call and sent him some language.

So if we could defer this to the end of the hearing, I would appreciate that. Maybe we could work through that language. Otherwise, we would request that the Court approve the order, and then we will submit what I would hope to be a agreed order at some point later today, if we can't get it done during the course of the hearing.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Bains and Mr. Eisenberg both want to address this issue, so let me hear from Mr. Bains and then we'll go to Mr. Eisenberg.

MR. BAINS: Good morning, Your Honor. Brandon

```
Bains on behalf of Hanover Insurance Company as well as
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. I had told Mr. Perez just
before this, we had spoke this morning. He suggested that
revise language that I'm looking at now. I feel pretty
confident that we can work through any issues.
```

I don't know that I can even characterize it as an objection; I think it's more of just clarifying some of the language to make sure the sureties have some protections in terms of the day-to-day operations on this. But I -- at least for my clients -- am pretty confident that I can work with counsel and get some revised language in front of the Court hopefully in the very near future.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. And Mr. Eisenberg, let me get your mike activated there. Go ahead, please.

MR. EISENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. May I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. EISENBERG: Thank you. Yes, I would also like to review the order so I can kind of get mine finalized as well while the hearing is going on.

THE COURT: That's fine. Mr. Perez, can you have someone forward a copy of what you sent to Mr. Bains, on over to Mr. Eisenberg, and when we circle back he'll have an opportunity to review it.

MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor. I'll do that right now. And, Your Honor, I just want to -- once we have some agreement on this language, I need to run through the paces to make sure that I have all consents on our side, so it might take a few more minutes even if we have agreement with Mr. Bains and Mr. Eisenberg.

THE COURT: Yeah. no, the only issue is whether there's going to be some disputes that I'll need to call on today. And if we need to do that later today, we can, or circle back even this morning or just call on you all to file an agreed order, you know, and then request a hearing if you can't agree on it. I'm not too nervous about what you're doing.

I do have a question on the function of paragraph 1 of the order, which is why I've got the order focused up on the screen on paragraph 1. I think maybe unintentionally -- and that's what I'm trying to figure out -- this would authorize the Debtors to pay reimbursement and indemnity obligations to the sureties prior to the time that the surety bonds -- prior to the time of the final order.

So let's assume that a surety bond gets called on, or some other security gets called on and there's a million dollar draw. This would, I think, authorize you to reimburse that million dollars.

I don't think that's what you're intending to do.

I think you're intending to pay premiums, I think you're intending to be sure things are safe. But I do think it would give that kind of authority and I'm a little nervous about doing that on day one. And I need to understand better whether that was something you were seeking authority to do or just something that I'm thinking of and you all hadn't thought of in the language.

Mr. Carlson or Mr. Perez, whoever wants to deal with that?

MR. PEREZ: This is Alfredo Perez. That was not our intention. We're not seeking to be paying those types of payments. Really, we're seeking just authority to capture what you said, paying surety premiums.

I know the Debtors would be comfortable with making that clarification, and with that form of order we could work on that language too.

THE COURT: All right. And I also don't know that it's -- this is a pretty unusual case, given what you're doing with Ms. Russell's client. And you know how nervous I am normally about these things, but given where the case is going, I don't want you all to feel uncomfortable. If in a week you need to pay a reimbursement, come back on an emergency basis and we'll deal with it.

I just don't think I should authorize it generally on first days, you know, without knowing what we're biting

```
1
   off here. But it may be appropriate to pay some sort of a
   reimbursement or an indemnity obligation under a bond or
2
   other credit, something like that.
 3
 4
              Just if you can include language that says you
 5
    wont' do that without a further court order or something of
 6
   that nature towards -- it's not just prohibited but you can
7
    come back. Does that work for you all?
8
             MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.
 9
             THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Bains and Mr. Eisenberg
10
    if you've got any problem with the concerns that I'm
11
   raising?
12
             MR. BAINS: This is Brandon Bains. I don't, Your
13
   Honor.
14
             THE COURT: Thank you.
15
             MR. EISENBERG: This is Philip Eisenberg on be
16
   half of US Specialty. No, Your Honor. I understood it.
17
              THE COURT: And from 817-319-9277, we have someone
18
   else that wanted to make a comment on this particular
19
   matter?
20
             MR. SCHARFENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor.
21
   is Elliot Scharfenberg. I represent RLI Insurance Company.
22
   We're another surety. If you wouldn't mind, can we get the
23
   revised order language before it is finalized? I can shoot
   you my email address.
24
```

THE COURT: Mr. Perez, is that okay with you? Can

```
you send it up to Mr. Scharfenberg's email?
 1
 2
              MR. PEREZ: Yes, sir. If he can just send me an
 3
    email, alfredo.perez@weil.com, I can forward it to him right
 4
    now.
 5
              MR. SCHARFENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
 6
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
 7
              MR. SCHARFENBERG: Mr. Perez, thank you.
 8
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
 9
              MR. BAINS: I just want to say, Mr. Perez, This is
10
    Brandon Bains again. I already sent an email over to Mr.
11
    Eisenberg and I can add Mr. Scharfenberg on there as well
12
    and get all the surety folks on one email for the revised
    language. It's easier, as you may have some other things on
13
14
    your plate this morning.
15
              MR. PEREZ: Thank you. I appreciate that.
                                                          I need
16
    all the help I can get.
17
              MR. BAINS: I'll get that taken care of right now.
18
              THE COURT: All right. Ms. Russell, I want to be
    sure that the addition that I'm talking about doesn't
19
20
    interfere with Apache's expectations in its deal where I
21
    leave open the question but just don't authorize it
22
    generally on first days.
23
              I know you're on -- I see you and I know you're on
24
               I'm going to find your name and hear from you
    the phone.
25
    about that, if that's okay.
```

```
1
              Ms. Russell, does that cause any heartburn to
   Apache?
 2
 3
              MS. RUSSELL: Your Honor, I don't believe it does.
 4
              THE COURT: All right, thank you.
 5
              Okay, why don't we do this. You all can circle
 6
   back to this during the hearing if you choose. Otherwise,
 7
    I'm going to approve the surety and the insurance bond order
   once the one change that I'm suggesting gets incorporated
8
 9
   and Mr. Bains, Mr. Eisenberg, and Mr. Scharfenberg sign off
    on it.
10
              You can do that if you want by filing it under a
11
   C&O that says that you've conferred with them and they've
12
   approved, you can have their signatures at the bottom. I
13
    just want something affirmative that they have in fact
14
15
    signed off on it.
              If they don't sign off on it or you all can't
16
17
   reach an agreement, you're free to authorize a further
18
   hearing -- or excuse me, to request a further hearing and
    I'll get you one quick. Everybody okay with that?
19
20
              MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.
21
              THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Carlson, where do you
22
   want to go next?
23
              MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, next on the agenda is
    our vendor motion filed at Docket No. 7.
24
25
              THE COURT: I'll get that up. All right, go
```

ahead, please.

MR. CARLSON: So, Your Honor, the Debtors operate over 300 platforms in the Gulf of Mexico offshore and own an interest in 364 different leases, so there are many creditors that Debtors are obligated to pay in the ordinary course, and there's sort of four buckets of claimants here.

There are the Interest Owner Payments that those are holders of royalty interests, things of that nature.

The second category are joint interest billings where the company has non-operator parents paying their share to operators of platforms of various expenses.

And the third category is more of a catch-all for all the operating expenses. These are payments to service providers on the offshore, many of which have least rights against the Debtors' property.

And then the fourth category is the section titled 503(b)(9) claims. These are just goods that were received by the Debtors within 20 days of the Petition date. And so if you look at page 3 of the motion that provides a breakdown of what's coming due, it's about 9.6 million in joint interest billings, 59.4 million in E&P operating expenses which is for various service providers, and then 4.6 million in 503(b)(9) claims.

You'll see in our proposed interim order that it's subject to each of those caps. In addition, we have the

requirement in paragraph 3 that each of the E&P claimants are required to sign a customary trade agreement that's on terms that are as favorable or more favorable than under the terms they were providing services prepetition.

So, Your Honor, unless Your Honor has questions, we would request that you enter the order in the amount and form attached to the motion.

THE COURT: Can you just take me through and define for me what an E&P claimant is under this? Is that everyone on all categories or is it just certain parties in certain categories?

MR. CARLSON: These are third parties that provide gathering, transportation and processing services. This also includes supplemental workforce obligations, lease operating expenses, other exploration and production costs, capital expenditures and related costs.

THE COURT: Does it include the 503(b)(9) claimants?

MR. CARLSON: It does not. So 4.6 million of the 503(b)(9) claims is exclusive of the estimated 69.4 million. We are --

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm looking at paragraph 3 and I got it that the joint interest shouldn't be included in this, but it seems to me that if you're going to pay somebody on a 503(b)(9) claim, they should enter into trade

agreements as well. Is there anything wrong with that as to the 503(b)(9) payments?

MR. CARLSON: No, Your Honor. I think that those are -- we're fine with 503(b)(9) claimants signing the customary agreements while -- we'll just defer to Mr. Dane, but I think that we'll get it.

THE COURT: Mr. Dane, let's be sure that you're okay with that. In general, it will tie your hands from making a 503(b)(9) payment unless the 503(b)(9) vendor agrees to continue to provide you goods and services. It gives you a hell of a negotiating authority because you can't do it.

So the question is whether it's going to hurt you by tying your hands and making you do it. In general, my experience has been that folks in your position like to be able to go to their vendor and say, "I really want to pay you but the court won't let me unless you do a trade agreement." So it's up to you. What do you think?

MR. DANE: I think I agree with Your Honor, with

your position.

THE COURT: Thank you Will those changes work

THE COURT: Thank you. Will those changes work that I did, to cover that?

MR. CARLSON: Yes, it works the way it is now.

THE COURT: All right. Is there any party that objects to authorizing -- essentially allowing the Debtors

to continue to make payments to these folks in the ordinary course?

I think it's justified by the original declarations. The payment of the joint interest billings are obvious in terms of why that needs to occur in order to keep the projects going. The payments of operating expenses, the Debtors determined they need to do that. These become critical vendors because of the nature of the trade agreements.

I think it is appropriate to do it, and obviously it's to the Debtors' interest to avoid these liens. When you counterbalance that, I think within the Code, there's some lien -- potential lienholders on the 503(b)(9) rights or people that have the right to assert an admin claim under 503(b)(9) should in fact agree to trade terms.

So if any party objects, please press five-star.

Mr. Carlson, when was your final -- is that August

24th at 1:30?

MR. CARLSON: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The vendor order has been signed. Give me just a moment to send it over to Mr. Laws so that he can get it docketed.

And it's been sent to docketing. All right? What do you want to do now?

MR. CARLSON: Thank you. Your Honor, the revised

interim DIP order has been filed at Docket No. 54. 1 THE COURT: All right, I've got that -- the 2 3 redline of that up on the screen and I'm just going to take 4 a look through it. I assume the parties are going to look 5 at it at the same time I'm looking, so if somebody needs me 6 to slow down, please press five star. 7 I'm only going to -- we've looked at everything other than the redlining, so I'm only going to try and get 8 9 down to that. 10 MR. CARLSON: And at page 25 is the first change. THE COURT: All right. (Reviewing order.) Does 11 12 anybody need more time to review that? If so, please press five star. 13 MR. EISENBERG: Your Honor? 14 15 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. EISENBERG: This is Philip Eisenberg. I don't 16 17 need more time to review it. I have a comment to it. 18 THE COURT: Let me do -- let me do one thing. Let me pull up -- so that I can have now the actual one as well. 19 20 Give me just a second. 21 Okay, so I've got the clean and the redlined both 22 up on the screen. Why don't you give me your comment? 23 MR. EISENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. Last evening 24 when I spoke with Mr. Carlson prior to seeing this redline,

which we saw this morning, I had indicated to him that when

we had raised this with Your Honor, that we had raised this in connection with various other rights, including recoupment, setoff, contractual reasons under operating agreements and other real rights that other parties might that are permitting encumbrances ahead of liens that the banks had under their own credit agreements.

And then Your Honor mentioned -- and lienholders.

And so in speaking with Mr. Carlson yesterday, I indicated that we would want that -- the inclusion of that in here as well. And so that, I believe -- otherwise that we're trying to keep from being impaired with this interim order, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not sure on your team who is addressing that, Mr. Perez.

MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, I will, Your Honor. So what we have here is intended to capture— it's intended to say this interim order is not affecting the rights or is not amending the rights of any parties in those liens. The way I'm reading it is the rights of any party asserting such statutory liens, if any, are not amended or modified under this interim order with respect to such statutory lien.

THE COURT: So I think his question is what if he has, as an example, a contractual right to certain, let's say, recoupment or setoffs under a contract, and that contract is assigned over to the DIP lender, are you cutting

```
1
    off his setoff or recoupment rights under the contract, by
 2
   way of example?
 3
              MR. CARLSON: No, I don't think we are. I think
 4
    this is -- this language is an embodiment to -- is intended
 5
    to capture and say that this interim order really is not
 6
    affecting any of those rights. That's how I read it and I
 7
    don't think the intent was to cut off any of those rights,
   but I --
 8
 9
              THE COURT: I think I can just -- if that's the
10
    intent, I think I can fix that, so let me try and get that
11
    done.
12
             MR. CARLSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: (Amending and displaying order.) Does
13
    that solve the issue?
14
15
              MR. EISENBERG: Again, Your Honor, do you mind
   putting it on the full screen? My eyes just can't see this
16
17
    on the split screen.
18
              THE COURT: Sure. (Displaying order.)
              MR. EISENBERG: Okay. There was language that was
19
20
    there and I guess Your Honor took it out, so -- okay, there
21
    it is. All right. Okay, so on page 25 after (A), you've
22
    got statutory rights but you don't have contractual rights.
23
    So --
              THE COURT: Yeah, no, the contractual rights I've
24
25
    got under (C) and (D).
```

1 MR. EISENBERG: Oh. Yeah, but -- okay, you've got 2 -- but, you've only got contractual rights to setoff. There 3 should be contractual liens that were granted. 4 THE COURT: Well, no, but if there's a contractual 5 lien that was granted that wasn't perfected, you don't have 6 one. 7 MR. EISENBERG: No, no, that's true. 8 THE COURT: But you do have a -- you may have a 9 setoff right under common law that we're not going to cut 10 off if it existed. And a recoupment right may not have existed on the date of the petition. It could arise later, 11 12 and that's being preserved. 13 MR. EISENBERG: Yes, Your Honor, and I --THE COURT: But I think you have all the rights 14 15 you should have. 16 MR. EISENBERG: No, no, I totally appreciate that, 17 and I appreciate the attention Your Honor's making with the 18 recoupment. But what I'm saying is you don't -- you have contractual rights -- (C) is contractual rights to sell. 19 20 And in the preface, valid, non-avoidable statutory 21 liens that are contractual rights, which I would assume

includes contractual liens. But then it goes on in the way

statutory rights but it doesn't have contractual rights that

were perfected, only contractual liens that were perfected.

the sentence is formulated, it goes back to (A). It says

22

23

24

```
So after statutory rights, after the letter (A),
1
2
    I would have --
 3
             THE COURT: Got it.
 4
             MR. EISENBERG: -- an alter --
 5
              THE COURT: I got it. I got it.
             MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I think that's covered in
 6
7
    the part before this, above. I think if he has -- if he has
   a valid consensual lien that was -- that is senior to the --
8
 9
    is senior to the (a) being other liens, that he keeps that,
10
    and that's what the first part of this paragraph does.
   not -- we're dealing with non-consensual liens here.
11
12
              THE COURT: Yeah. So except for -- let me just --
13
   I think I can get this. Give me a shot. (Amending order.)
14
   So if you're junior to the whole stack and you file a lien,
15
    you don't jump ahead of the whole stack. You had to have
16
    filed the first lien.
17
             MR. EISENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I will submit to
18
   you that under the formulation credit agreement that it only
   has to be a permitted lien that the first lienholders and
19
20
    their credit agreements and liens that would be a permitted
21
    encumbrance of a prime lien, and so --
22
              THE COURT: Oh, I agree with that, but that is
23
    covered by the prior language that Mr. Perez points out. If
24
    it's a permitted lien, this doesn't prime it.
25
             MR. EISENBERG: All right, I appreciate that.
                                                              Ιf
```

```
that's what the intention is, then this language will be
1
    satisfactory and I appreciate everybody's consideration.
2
 3
   And in particular Mr. Carlson for all the communication.
 4
              THE COURT: And putting up with you probably.
 5
             MR. EISENBERG: Yes. No doubt about that, Your
 6
   Honor. He'll talk about that when I'm long gone.
7
              THE COURT: Mr. Perez or Mr. Carlson, does this
8
   language work for your client?
9
             MR. CARLSON: I think it works for the Debtors,
    Your Honor. I would want to make sure it works for our DIP
10
    lenders, of course, and I'd want to confirm with Ms.
11
   Tsiouris first.
12
13
             THE COURT: Ms. Tsiouris, let me get your line
   activated here. I think I mis-clicked. There we go.
14
   Ms. Tsiouris, good morning.
15
             MS. TSIOURIS: Good morning, Your Honor. For the
16
17
   record, Natasha Tsiouris, Davis Polk & Wardwell. I think at
18
   the bottom line of this is that I believe (C) and (D) should
   be tied to the statutory lienholders who fit into categories
19
20
    (A) and (B), so the suggestion I would make is instead of
   making a separate entry, just do a comma that includes the
21
22
    statutory rights and automatically sets out the Petition
23
   Date or --
24
                         Why don't you dictate more
              THE COURT:
```

specifically to me what you want because I'm not following

exactly what the change is, and I'm happy to be a secretary here for a bit.

MS. TSIOURIS: Thank you, Your Honor. So instead of separate categories for (C) and (D), I think it should be tied to those lien -- I can't see all the way up, but it should be those lienholders that have statutory rights that were perfected as of the Petition Date or the statutory rights were perfected as of the Petition Date.

THE COURT: Well, those aren't going to arise under statute. I think I'm missing how the language would work, and maybe you can literally dictate to me what you think would work, so that I can take a shot at it.

MS. TSIOURIS: So provided, further, that, for the avoidance of doubt, nothing herein provides that the DIP liens are deemed to prime any valid, non-avoidable statutory liens (indiscernible) that (A) statutory rights were perfected as of the Petition Date or (B) statutory rights were in existence immediately prior to the Petition date and are perfected subsequent to the Petition Date as permitted by section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and the rights of any party asserting such statutory lien (if any) are not amended or modified under this Interim Order with respect to such statutory lien, including any contractual right to set off such right as of the Petition Date or --

THE COURT: Hold on. Let me just read it. I

don't think that works because you're now including something that isn't defined there because the setoff rights, for example, aren't perfected subsequent to the Petition Date as permitted by section 546(b). They simply exist free of the statute. And that's why I thought we needed a separate listing.

MS. TSIOURIS: And, again, under contractual rights to set off, contractual rights are defined.

THE COURT: I don't think they are defined in the statute. I think that's the problem that Mr. Eisenberg is raising. So he has a -- let's say that he has in his surety agreement a contractual right to set off a deposit that he's holding against an indemnity obligation that somebody has to his client -- and I don't know if he has that or not -- we're preserving that right for him. Not because of the statute, but because of the contract.

MS. TSIOURIS: Yeah, but -- and then is it defined in the order, because it's not necessary for those who have a writing. It wouldn't be a separate writing. They have, you know, a contractual right to set off. They would be (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Got it. Hold on. Contract rights of any non-RSA party. I got your point. And I think that probably fixes it, right?

MS. TSIOURIS: I think that does.

MR. EISENBERG: And then, Your Honor, but I thought that Contractual Rights is capitalized in (B). And I think (indiscernible) is lower case.

THE COURT: Got it. But I also think she has a legitimate concern that this shouldn't take away her right to prime people that she's specifically got a deal with on priming them. So it's for the folks who aren't here. Or who are here and that's really trying to catch up.

MR. CARLSON: And, Your Honor, elsewhere in the order it says that Apache, not being here, it primes the Apache collateral and Apache assets, so Apache is an RSA target and I just don't want any confusion on that. They're not -- they're dealt with in a different part of the order.

THE COURT: I agree with that.

MS. TSIOURIS: Your Honor, you said we need to prime party -- I don't understand prime party definition but (indiscernible).

I think that sort of incorporates the term into the definition. But I think this protects you, right?

Because whatever rights you've got under the RSA you're totally keeping. We're only dealing with a non-RSA party here, and Apache can only be helped by this provision, so their carveout works.

MS. TSIOURIS: I think that's right. I think that's right.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to go back for a moment, now, to the redline so that we can continue to go through that. And just get closer to your screen here for a minute, Mr. Perez.

All right, Mr. Carlson, where's the next thing that we need to look at?

MR. CARLSON: Page 58 and 57, paragraph 30.

THE COURT: (Reviewing order.) That solves the problem I had. All right, are there any other objections or concerns with the DIP order?

MR. EISENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. Philip Eisenberg on behalf of US Specialty. Yesterday, in the cross examination of Mr. Hanson, he had indicated that he was aware of no releases that were being granted, but we (indiscernible) in this interim order the unconditional release of prepetition secured parties.

And I didn't think that that was appropriate for the first day. He had indicated there weren't any, and then I had thought I had saw in the draft, and I just wanted to highlight that for Your Honor that an unconditional release is being given by the Debtors in an interim order on the first day.

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, it's all subject to challenge, so there is -- it's kind of standard. They're going to lend this money, we're going to need your release

on that. I believe that the testimony is, yeah, it's all subject to the -- it's all subject to the challenge.

I mean, there's -- all of their rights are preserved. The rights of the Committee are preserved and the rights of everybody else are preserved subject to the challenge. I can't imagine that anybody's going to lend this money without us saying "we're not going to release them."

MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, if you go to paragraph 23, that's the challenge period paragraph, paragraph 5, it's subject to the right to challenge.

THE COURT: Mr. Eisenberg, I had originally read it the way that they are reading it. Are you reading it somehow differently than that?

MR. EISENBERG: No. There's two things.

Typically, it's a situation as to validity, priority and extent. This is something that is akin to that, and there is a challenge period upon the validity, priority and extent.

This is a release of all claims. And so -- and even if it's appropriate for the Debtor to do it as part of his deal, I don't think it's appropriate or permissible to put that into the challenge period and force that relief on third parties. It's one thing with regard to the stipulations; it's another thing with the release of claims

```
1
   themselves in the stipulation.
 2
             THE COURT: Yeah, I --
 3
             MR. EISENBERG: And I know this isn't final but
 4
    this says unconditionally and --
 5
              THE COURT: It says the Debtors unconditionally
 6
   release that somebody else can come in and assert it.
 7
   There's no one in their right mind that lends you
    $100 million and doesn't get a release. I'm overruling
 8
 9
    the objection. I appreciate it and I'm overruling it.
10
             MR. EISENBERG: Then I understand that, Your
11
   Honor, but what about the making of it binding on third
   parties? Not the validity, priority and extent but the
12
   release of claims?
13
             THE COURT: I understand. They need to come in
14
15
   and upset that if they want to. No one's going to lend you
16
   $100 million. I mean, it's -- I just -- this is a lot of
17
   money. They're not -- this isn't 50 bucks.
18
             MR. EISENBERG: I understand that, Your Honor.
   All right. I appreciate it. I wanted to bring it to the
19
20
   Court's attention and --
21
              THE COURT: No, thank you. I've got no problem
22
   with you raising it, but I'm just going to overrule it.
23
             MR. EISENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
24
              THE COURT: Thank you. I'm ruling essentially on
25
    the testimony that I have that, you know, taking all things
```

into account, this is the best deal that is available. 1 2 There are no known claims here that the Debtor is 3 releasing, and this is such standard practice, inside and 4 outside of bankruptcy, that you release the financial 5 institution that lends you substantial amounts of money. It may not apply in a residential home lending 6 7 context or something like that, but it would always apply in this kind of a situation. The Debtors' getting a huge 8 9 benefit out of this, and I'm going to authorize it. 10 All right. I have listened to the objections. 11 We've made pretty significant changes in the draft of the order. Having heard the objections, I have sustained some 12 13 by making changes to the order, overruled others, and for 14 the reasons yesterday and while I was approving the DIP 15 order, I am now approving it in final -- a final interim 16 form and signing the interim order. And --17 MS. TSIOURIS: Your Honor, I don't know if you can 18 hear me, if my line is still active? 19 THE COURT: I can. And I was about to send it to 20 docketing. So I'm glad you spoke up. Go ahead. 21 MS. TSIOURIS: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. 22 I apologize. Just going back to the language, I think it 23 was on the .pdf page 25, that we were looking at, the

language that's attached to the RSA Parties

THE COURT: Yes.

24

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
MS. TSIOURIS: We have some parties who we are
priming who are not parties to the RSA. For instance, the
(indiscernible) lenders and also potentially there's parties
who are creditors who have not actually signed the RSA's.
          THE COURT: Okay. So what language do we need
here?
         MS. TSIOURIS: We need contractual rights of any
party that has been permitted to be primed under the
existing credit agreements (indiscernible).
         THE COURT: I'm going to -- I think I can
incorporate that. Just a minute.
         MS. TSIOURIS: Good. Thank you, Your Honor.
I believe it should be the (indiscernible) agreement.
          THE COURT: Okay. Hold on a minute. I'm just
trying to make room on the .pdf to get another edit in.
(Amending order.) All right. Okay, I'm now editable again.
Go ahead and tell me what I need to do.
         MS. TSIOURIS: Thank you, Your Honor. So I
believe it should say, would be -- I just want to catch
where I was. Any parties that were not primed by a
prepetition credit agreement -- that were permitted to be
primed under a prepetition credit agreement.
          THE COURT: (Amending order.) Is that the language
you want? And then I would include the same language down
here?
```

```
1
             MS. TSIOURIS: That's right. And then could I
    just have -- instead of (indiscernible) including
 2
 3
    (indiscernible) if they were not properly perfected, they
 4
    don't jump ahead. They must be properly perfected, and then
 5
    their contractual rights (indiscernible).
              THE COURT: But the contractual rights don't have
 6
7
    to be perfected. They exist free of perfection. That was
    the issue.
8
9
             MS. TSIOURIS: Oh, that's right. I'm sorry, Your
   Honor. Okay, that's fine. That's fine.
10
11
              THE COURT: Okay.
12
             MR. EISENBERG: Your Honor, I understand they have
    the prepetition creditors language but any other party that
13
    consented to be primed under this prepetition creditors
14
15
    agreement?
              THE COURT: I'm not sure there's a difference
16
17
   between those two, but --
18
             MS. TSIOURIS: No, I'm sorry. It's to be not
   permitted to be primed under the prepetition creditors
19
20
    agreement. I agree.
21
             THE COURT: Tell me again.
22
             MS. TSIOURIS: For other parties, that is not
23
   permitted to be primed under the prepetition creditors
24
    agreement. It's their right or not permitted to be primed.
25
             MR. EISENBERG: I can live with that language.
```

```
1
    Thank you, Your Honor.
 2
              THE COURT: (Amending order.) How did I do now?
 3
   Now that you've put in the "not"?
 4
              MR. EISENBERG: Thank you so much, Your Honor.
 5
              THE COURT: Ms. Tsiouris, does that work for you?
              MS. TSIOURIS: Yes, that's fine.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: All right, thank you. Let me get this
 8
    saved. I have now sent the DIP to docketing.
 9
              All right, Mr. Carlson?
10
              MR. CARLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. We have four
   motions left, the taxes, utilities, consolidated creditor
11
12
    agreements and an extension of the schedules and SOFAs. And
13
   my colleague, Jason George.
14
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. George, if you would
15
   press five star on your phone, please.
16
              Ms. Tsiouris, I'm going to leave you available to
17
    speak at any point.
18
              Mr. Schiable, I see that you had an issue and I
    apologize I didn't call on you before.
19
20
              Go ahead, Mr. Schiable.
21
              MR. SCHIABLE: (Indiscernible.)
22
              THE COURT: Thank you. All right, from
23
              917-536-1154, is that you, Mr. George?
24
              MR. GEORGE: Yes, it is, Your Honor. Good
25
            Jason George, Weil Gotshal Manges, proposed
   morning.
```

counsel to the Debtors. I have four motions to present to the Court today. They're Agenda Items 5 and 7 through 9.

They're the taxes motion, utilities, creditor agreements motion and schedules and SOFA motion. I'll present the motions in that order unless Your Honor has a preference.

THE COURT: No. You said you wanted to start with taxes? Or what did you want to start with? Just tell me again, which ever one you want to start with is fine.

MR. GEORGE: Taxes, Docket No. 5

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, please.

MR. GEORGE: Pursuant to the motion, the Debtors request authority to pay certain prepetition taxes owed to various taxing authorities. The Debtors owe approximately \$2.7 million in prepetition taxes consist of franchise taxes, severance taxes property taxes, income taxes and various regulatory assessments.

As explained more fully in the motion, the penalty not to pay the taxes and assessments can have very negative impacts on the Debtors' business and operations. Therefore, the Debtors submit that paying prepetition taxes and assessments is a valid exercise of their business judgment. Moreover most, if not all of the taxes would be afforded priority treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, and so payment really is a matter of timing.

I'm not sure if Your Honor has any questions. The

Debtors respectfully request that the Court grant the motion.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear if there are any objections to the taxes motion. If anyone does objection, would you please press five star on your phone.

All right, in a case like this, where the taxes are sought to be paid, it's almost a no-brainer where there are these huge severance taxes that are accruing and you have to deal with your regulators. And it makes no sense not to pay these, that are always going to get paid under every circumstance that one can imagine.

The Debtors seek authority. No one is opposing it. I have signed the order, and the taxes are authorized to be paid, and I have sent that to docket.

Mr. George, what do you want to do next?

MR. GEORGE: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll do the utilities motion, which is filed at Docket No. 11.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GEORGE: With this motion, the Debtors are seeking approval of the proposed form of adequate of future payment to utility providers, procedures for resolving objections by utility companies relating the sufficiency of the adequate assurance, and prohibiting the utility providers from altering, refusing or discontinuing the service.

The Debtors estimated that the cost of their utility services for the next 30 days will be approximately \$662,500, which is based on the prior twelve months. The Debtors propose placing half that amount into a segregated account for the benefit of the utility providers in the form of adequate assurance.

To the extent that the utility companies do not agree with the adequate assurance deposit under the proposed order, they are permitted to seek additional adequate assurance during the Chapter 11 cases.

The Debtors believe that the proposed adequate assurance and objection procedures are reasonable and customary. We've reviewed them prior to filing with the United States Trustee's Office and received no objections.

I'm not sure if Your Honor has any questions, but I would request the Court grant this motion.

THE COURT: So paragraph 8 allows your client to add a utility to the list at any time. So 366 requires that you provide the adequate assurance not later than 30 days from the petition date. this would allow you to add somebody on the 60th day, which means you would not have complied with 366. How can I do that?

MR. GEORGE: Well, I think that the reason for that is we have procedures in place where we'd actually increase the allowed deposit to allow for the additional two

```
weeks, so we'd be, you know, replacing any --
1
             THE COURT: I understanding. Yeah, no, I
2
 3
   understand why it makes sense. I don't understand why it
 4
   would comply with the statute. The statute says you've got
 5
   to provide them the adequate assurance within 30 days. And
   you would not have done that because you didn't even know
 6
7
   they were there.
8
             MR. GEORGE: That's correct, Your Honor. We think
 9
   this is a practical resolution. You know, the fact that
10
   there's an additional utility provider that should be
11
   provided as adequate assurance that this, you know, will
12
   give them the ability to do that.
13
             THE COURT: I think it's a very practical
   solution. I don't think it's consistent with the law.
14
   That's my question to you, is how is consistent with the
15
16
    law? Congress was really specific here.
17
             MR. GEORGE: I guess, Your Honor --
18
             THE COURT: Do you want to add them but only
   within the first 30 days? Would that work for your client?
19
20
             MR. GEORGE: Yeah. Yes, Your Honor, I believe
21
   that would be a solution. We'd be agreeable to that.
22
             THE COURT: (Amending order.) All right. And do
23
   you want your final on August 24th, the same as the others,
24
   or did you want a different day for your final?
25
             MR. GEORGE: I believe August 24th should be
```

sufficient, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection to the utility order by any party?

(No response.)

THE COURT: All right. As Mr. George says, it's pretty standard fare, and I have signed the order. Mr. George, where do you want to go next?

MR. GEORGE: Thank you, Your Honor. The creditor matrix motion is filed at Docket No. 9.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, please.

MR. GEORGE: First, the Debtors are requesting authority to file a consolidated list of creditors and separate matrices for each Debtor and to file a consolidated list of the Debtors' 30 largest unsecured claims.

Your Honor, there's 14 Debtors in these Chapter 11 cases and thousands of creditors and parties-in-interest.

many of the creditors overlap. Therefore, maintaining a single consolidated list of creditors will benefit the Debtors and their estates by allowing Debtors to more efficiently provide the required notices to parties and to (indiscernible).

Second, Your Honor, the Debtors also seek authority to redact certain personal information, namely addresses of their employees, from the creditor matrices and the lists of equity security holders, and also redact

```
addresses primarily to protect employees from identify theft
1
    and their permission to use (indiscernible).
2
              We did discuss this with the United States Trustee
 3
 4
   prior to filing the motion and language, that we would
 5
   provide unredacted copies to the Court and upon request to
   the United States Trustee and counsel for any entities
 6
7
    employed in these cases on a confidential, professional
   eyes only basis.
8
 9
              THE COURT: So I'm okay with you up to the point
    that you say it's a confidential that you say it's a
10
11
    confidential, professional eyes only basis. So the Official
12
    Committee, let's say, needs to serve people on the list.
   How are they going to serve them if they can't use it?
13
              MR. GEORGE: That's a good point, Your Honor. I
14
    think to the extent that they need to serve the parties, we
15
16
   would provide the address information that they need.
17
              THE COURT: I think I'm going to trust both the
18
    Committees and the U.S. Trustee to comply with their duties
19
    and take out that language. Otherwise, I don't see how they
    can meet their service obligation to those individuals.
20
21
              Any objection to that change?
22
         (No audible response.)
23
              THE COURT: Any party object to the motion?
24
         (No audible response.)
```

THE COURT: All right. I have signed the order

and we'll get that docketed. Let me get that done.

All right, what do you have next?

MR. GEORGE: Thank you, Your Honor. Last up is the Debtors motion for an extension of time to file their schedules and statement. That's at Docket No. 10.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GEORGE: And we're also seeking additional time to file a Rule 2015.3 Reports as well.

So for the -- as pertains to the schedules and statements, the Debtors request an extension of the 14-day period to file schedules and statements by an additional 30 days through and including September 17, 2020, without prejudice to seek further extensions. Additionally, the schedules in this case is a substantial undertaking. You know, the Debtors and their professionals must compile the information from voluminous books and records related to thousands of claims and parties-in-interest.

And Your Honor noted yesterday during the hearing, that Debtors were in the middle of negotiating, you know, very complex transactions. Their resources are currently mainly focused to those goals, therefore given the size and complexity of the case and everything that's currently ongoing, the Debtors believe there's cause -- ample cause to grant the extension.

THE COURT: Does anyone oppose the extension of

```
the filing date for the schedules and the statements?
 1
          (No audible response.)
 2
 3
              THE COURT: All right. I'm granting your motion.
 4
              MR. GEORGE: Thank you, Your Honor.
 5
              THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. George. What else do
 6
    we have?
 7
              MR. GEORGE: That's all for me. I'll cede the
 8
   podium to my colleagues.
 9
              THE COURT: All right, thank you.
10
              MR. GEORGE: Thank you.
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Perez, do we have
11
12
    anything further that we're supposed to cover today?
13
              MR. PEREZ: No, Your Honor, nothing further. I
   have a couple of comments. Number one, and I neglected to
14
    say this when we were talking about the DIP order.
15
    budget that was filed is a proposed budget, subject to
16
17
    approval, so I just wanted to confirm that, number one.
18
              Number two, we are -- we have been exchanging
    emails on the insurance order. I don't -- we're not quite
19
20
    done yet but hopefully we will have a form of order to give
    to the Court later this morning and we'll submit and I'm
21
22
    hoping that it will be consensual, but we'll see.
23
              Third, Your Honor, in connection with the filing,
24
    the Court may have noticed that currently the company does
25
    not have any hedges -- that it's subject to any current
```

hedges, or maybe one that's just about to roll off. And having the DIP order entered was one of the prerequisites to restarting the hedging program.

So this is just a long way of saying that we may be back to you earlier than the 24th with a hedging motion. And while I know the Court has from time to time indicated that they thought hedging was in the ordinary course of business, unfortunately we have not been able to persuade any counterparties that you're correct. So I think this is your fault --

THE COURT: But they are wrong, Mr. Perez.

MR. PEREZ: I think this is your fault, Your
Honor, not mine, so it's one way of saying we may -- you may
see our smiling faces back earlier than the 24th.

THE COURT: All right. If you need a hedging motion, go ahead and get it filed. Hopefully, we'll have a Committee up by the time you file your hedging motion, and I do feel pretty strongly that that's ordinary course.

If you can get the Committee to agree on such a motion, can you file it as an emergency agreed motion with the Committee? And I'm not going to hold a hearing on a hedging motion if the Committee and you agree that it's ordinary course.

I understand you need a comfort matter but, you know, these hearings cost you \$25,000 or more, and I would

rather do it without a hearing on something where I disagree 1 with the need for it. I understand your need for the 2 3 comfort -- I'm not criticizing your need for that even in 4 the slightest, but if you have the Committee on board, and 5 you and the Committee and I are on the same page, I'm not holding a hearing on it, and we'll get the comfort. 6 7 MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. And I just got a note from Mr. Dane that I just want to make sure that what 8 9 I indicated was what was requested in his note, but I just 10 hadn't seen it before I spoke. 11 THE COURT: All right. If there's anyone else that wants to raise any issue in Fieldwood, now's the time. 12 Otherwise we're going to adjourn Fieldwood and move to our 13 9:00 o'clock docket. 14 (No audible response.) 15 THE COURT: All right, thank you all. Fieldwood 16 17 is adjourned. 18 (Proceedings adjourned at 9:13 a.m.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	I certify that the foregoing is a correct
2	transcript to the best of my ability produced from the
3	electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-
4	entitled matter.
5	/S/ MARY D. HENRY
6	CERTIFIED BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
7	ELECTRONIC REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS, CET**D-337
8	JUDICIAL TRANSCRIBERS OF TEXAS, LLC
9	JTT TRANSCRIPT #62466
10	DATE FILED: AUGUST 6, 2020
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	